Abstract-This research studies community detection in multiplex dark networks. Our method seeks to intelligently select appropriate layers for aggregation to approximate communities in the whole network, while reducing the impact of over-modeling the network. Community evolution is explored as layers of different types of information are added to the partial picture of the network. We determine the set of dominant layers needed to produce similar community partitions to the established ground truth aggregate network. The identification of dominant layers enhances the selection of which layers to choose for aggregation purposes. This reduces redundancy and noise, and increases the optimization of the available data to produce the desired network partitions. We use normalized mutual index (NMI), purity, density, and modularity for methodology evaluation and comparison metrics.
Introduction
Community detection in multiplex networks has been studied by two main approaches; aggregation and nonaggregation. The first approach involves collapsing all of the layers of a multiplex network into a single layer for analysis. This allows for established single layer community detection algorithms to be implemented, but at the cost of information loss [1] . The second approach considers community detection algorithms that move between layers without aggregation. This paper examines the layer aggregation approach and attempts to refine the selection of which layers to aggregate.
Taylor [1] says that layer aggregation can be extremely beneficial for network analysis if conducted appropriately. He asserts that one of the fundamental problems of layer aggregation is determining which layers to aggregate. Using all of the available layers of a network can actually over-model a network. Taylor explains that over-modeling leads to computational and memory storage difficulties. He suggests that repetitive layers should be aggregated to more concisely represent the network. His work supports the idea of increased detectability of communities in a network when layers are aggregated. In this paper we establish additional criteria for layer aggregation using community evolution to determine which layers or set of layers are dominant in the network for producing communities. We examine three dark terrorist networks and two transportation networks. We use Normalized Mutual Information (NMI), purity, density, and modularity as metrics for comparing our resultant community evolution cases to the established ground truth communities from the layer aggregation.
Sharma [2] has done preliminary research on the impact of missing data on the network model. He asserts that missing data has a more profound effect upon the analysis conducted on multiplex networks than other types of network models. One metric used is "exclusive relevance", which determines the importance of a particular layer, L, based upon the fraction of connections from a node, n, to the nodes adjacent to n in L. We build upon this concept of establishing layer importance by exploring the contribution of each layer to final community structure of a graph.
Methodology
In this section we describe our dark social network and man-made transportation data sets and explain our community evolution experiment.
Network Data Sets
We explore three terrorist networks: Noordin Top, Boko Haram, and FARC; and two transportation networks: European Union Airport, and London Transportation.
The Noordin Top Network is a terrorist network that operates in Indonesia, and we use it as the aggregation of 14 layers. Each layer represents a different relationship type amongst 139 terrorists present in all the layers, and a total of 1499 edges. This network captures the relationships of five major terrorist organizations that operate in Indonesia. Noordin Top is the key broker between these organizations and exercises his influence to conduct large scale terrorist training events and operations [3] .
The Boko Haram Network is a terrorist network that operates in Nigeria, and we use it as the aggregation of 9 different relationship types amongst 105 terrorists for a total of 73 edges. This network captures the relationships of an Islamic extremist organization that primarily operates in Nigeria [4] .
The FARC Network is a terrorist network that operates in Columbia, and we use it as the aggregation of 10 different relationship types amongst 142 terrorists for a total of 1527 edges. This network illustrates the relationships of the FARC terrorist organization that operates in Colombia [5] .
The EU Air Transportation Network is an aggregation of 37 layers each representing an airline with flights within Europe. Each of the 450 nodes represents an airport and the 3588 edges represent a flight. The full network is further subdivided into three categories: 18 layers for major and national airlines, 10 layers for discount airlines, and 9 layers for other airlines (mostly regional, charger, and cargo carriers) [6] .
The London Transportation Network is a three-layer network of public transportation rail lines: the underground, the overground, and the docklands light railway. The 369 nodes each represent a station and the 441 edges represent connections between those stations via one of the rail systems [7] .
Experiment Overview
Our experiment examines the evolution of community proprieties as different combinations of layers are aggregated and compared against ground truth. Every combination of layers is labeled a separate case for analysis. For each case, we assume the ground truth to be the aggregation of all layers. The community detection algorithm we implemented was the Louvain method [8] , which is a modularity based approach to partitioning the network. The methodology can be adapted for any other community detection algorithm. The community features we examine are the normalized mutual index (NMI) and purity. We also examine the global properties of the graph by recording modularity with regard to the Louvain partition we got, clustering coefficient, and density for each case. We now outline the experiment methodology. If all combinations of layers would be considered, then one would need to check 2 n cases, where n is the total number of layers. That is infeasible for large networks. We thus further divided the layers of each terrorist network into categories based on layer attributes [9] . Table 1 displays a summary of the network categories and respective number of cases. We examined all of these cases for each network and presented a graph of the dominant layer(s) based on our comparison metrics, NMI and purity. 
Comparison Metrics
Both comparison metrics used (NMI and purity) are based on building the confusion matrix constructed from the community partitions found from the Louvain method of community detection. In each case the two networks compared are the ground truth network (as the aggregation of all the layers), and an aggregation of a combination of one or more layers.
If the ground truth is known, Orman suggests Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) as an algorithm performance measure [8] . This metric compares two different partitions, P a and P b , of the same set of data [10] as
where n i,j counts the false positives: the vertices identified by the algorithm to be community i when in reality, the vertices belong to community j. NMI values range from 0 to 1, with larger values more highly correlating to the communities in the ground truth. Another measure for calculating similarity between partitions is purity. Purity identifies the likely community counterparts in two separate network partitions based on the idea that a community in P a corresponds to the community in P b with the highest number of mutual nodes [11] . The formula to compute it summing the maximum values of the for each row (or column) of the confusion matrix [12] :
Results and Analysis
In this section we display the dominant case results for the Noordin, Boko Haram, FARC, European Airline Transportation, and London Transportation Networks. We displayed the results from our methodology in two plots for each network, which corresponds to the dominant combination of layers within categories, as well as the dominant categories within the entire network respectively. The dominant cases from each layer combination and category combination are plotted on the x-axis for each network. On the y-axis we plotted the NMI in blue, purity in purple, density in red, modularity in black, and clustering coefficient in green. As expected, we are looking for high values for NMI and purity, close to 1. While for the density, modularity and clustering coefficient we look for the combination of values similar to the values of the network itself.
We begin with the Dark Networks. Figure 1(a) shows the best combination of layers within each category of Noordin. We examine each category and determine which combination of layers within the category will yield the best results when compared to the aggregated category monoplex (Ground Truth). We notice that the slope for purity and NMI begins to level off after only four of the eight layers are combined. In this case only 50% of the layers are required to represent the community structure of the trust category.
Figure 1(b) shows that knowledge category is the dominant single category and that the knowledge and trust categories provide the best combination of two categories. This is consistent with the behaviour of dark networks. Recall that the knowledge category accounts for more than 50% of the edges in the Noordin data set, thus it is expected to be the most dominant category. The trust category represents many of the social relationships, which suggests that the community structure of social relationships is unique. Therefore uniqueness and edge density are important factors when determining which layers or categories are dominant in the data set.
Comparing the layers within each category to the aggregated monoplex of the layers within the category (ground truth of the category) in Figure 2 (a) resulted in the following observations. For the trust category, the dominant set of layers included superior, colleague, and kinship. These layers are similar in meaning to the dominant trust layer combination from the Noordin Network. Figure 2 (b) displays that trust category was the best for 1-combination, and trust and knowledge was the best 2-category combination, consistent with the results on the Noordin Network. This supports our observation from Noordin that the edges in the trust layers provide a uniqueness in information that is required to build the final communities in the monoplex. Since the edges were relatively equally distributed in the Boko Haram Network, there was no obvious dominant category that could be identified by edge density. As a result, the uniqueness from the trust layers dominated as the single most important category.
We next compare the layers within each category to the monoplex of the layers within the category (ground truth of the category) in Figure 3(a) . For the trust category, the dominant set of layers four layers included superior, lovers, support, and kinship. These layers are similar in meaning to the dominant trust layer combination from the Noordin and Boko Haram Networks. In all three networks, these layers represented intimate relationships between individuals. Figure 3 (b) displays that LOC category was the best for 1-category, and trust and LOC was the best 2-category combination. The dominant 2-category result supports our intuition on the trust category that trust layers provide a uniqueness in information that is required to build the final communities in the monoplex. The edges were predominantly distributed in the LOC category in the FARC Network and as a result, the LOC category that could be easily identified as dominant by edge density.
The European Airlines Network is divided into 3 categories of Major Airlines, Discount Airlines and Other airlines. Compared to the terrorist networks, this network has a lot of layers and for computational purpose. Truth for the entire network is compared to the three categories, and we discover that the NMI and purity stay around the value of 0.6 for both 1 and 2-combinations of categories. Our interpretation of these results is due to the inherent structure of man-made systems. Airlines have different hubs depending on which network they fall under. This leads to low value of NMI and purity when compared to the Ground truth. Especially when we look at 1 and 2-combinations. Furthermore, man-made networks typically focus on efficiency, an even distribution of flights between places depending on the size of airline company, and overall economy.
For all 3 categories, we observe that the n-combination yielded in the gradual and linear increase in the value of NMI and purity. A single airline company does not cover all or the large portion of the network. As we add an airline, we bring more nodes (different) and edges to the network. This again makes sense as different company caters to different location and geographical locations.
The London Transportation Network is divided into three layers. They are Tube (Underground), Overground and DLR (Dockland Light Railway). When compared to the Ground Truth, we observed that the Tube (underground) performed the best as 1-combination and Tube and Overground performed best as 2-combinations. Not all 2-combinations produced better results than the 1-combination alone. For example, the NMI value of each of the DLR and Overground compared to the Ground Truth was similar to their union compared to Ground Truth.
Aggregation of layers from 3 categories
In this section we observe results of the best ncombination of layers from each category compared to the full network monoplex. Selection of best n-combination for each category was based on following criteria: (i) NMI value close to 0.8 − 0.9, and (ii) Adding an extra layer does not significantly increase the NMI value.
The results are summarized in Figure 6 . We observe that the dominant layers for Dark Networks are dictated socially based on trust and the professional network based on knowledge. Our interpretation for the LOC category is that the layers change as the edges (relations) between people change based on trust and knowledge. We can not really rely on LOC category because of the nature of the changing communication procedure. However, the social relation between the people and their roles within the organization tends to change less. For the man-made networks our method did not yield any concrete results. We believe this is due to the human design based on efficiency.
Conclusions and Further Studies
In this research, we considered the value added by different combinations of layers in community detection. The NMI and purity metrics consistently supported the same conclusions for the dominant layer(s) for each network as detailed below. Moreover, our results suggest that the dominant combination of the layers is approached when the difference between subsequent NMI and purity values becomes relatively small.
For terrorist networks, in two of the three networks the dominant combination of layers resulted from the trust category. The outlier in this case was the FARC network, in which the LOC category was extremely dense and accounted for 98% of the edges. However, in both the Noordin and Boko Haram networks, the trust category accounted for only 22% and 31% of the edges in their network. As expected, the layer density is very important in determining dominance. However, when edge density is evenly distributed as in Noordin and Boko Haram, the layers within the trust categories are shown to be critical. Unlike a standard social relationship, cliques in dark social network are unlikely to be identified from partial information. As a result, the clustering coefficient of the trust category was lower, and the modularity was higher. In all three terrorist networks, trust layers substantially improve the NMI and purity values. This supports the notion that the trust layers provide critical information in the development of the final community structure.
The analysis revealed by the dark social networks is contrasted by the physical structure of the man-made transportation networks. Recall that in the EU Airline network, each layer represents the routes conducted by a different airline. To provide customers with different airline travel options, many of the airlines visit the same cities. Furthermore, we observed that the routes and the number of cities for each airline are close to uniformly distributed among the airlines. Taylor [1] would consider many of the EU Airline Network layers redundant. The redundant physical structure of this network is a product of the man-made economic competition between airlines. This network structure is similarly observed in the London Transportation Network between different modes of transportation. We observe that adding more layers to a partial transportation network produces a gradually increasing NMI and purity value. This behavior is consistently observed in all three airline categories.
Overall, determining the dominant layers based on community evolution and layer aggregation can be used to choose the best layers or types of layers for dark social networks within a predetermined threshold accuracy. For example, for an NMI threshold value of 0.85 and a qualitatively non-increasing subsequent combination improvement, the best combination of layers for Noordin Top in the trust category is friendship, classmates, kinship, and mentorship supervisory. This represented 87% of edges in the trust category. Applying a similar approach to the knowledge category resulted in operations and logistical place as the best layer combination. Similarly, communication alone was best combination for LOC category. When the above layers were aggregated into a monoplex and compared to the complete ground truth of Noordin Network, it yielded NMI value of 0.78. Here, the aggregation of 7 layers had total of 704 out of 2451 edges in Noordin Network, which is approximately 29% of information compared to entire data set.
We believe that testing our methodology on larger dark networks is worthwhile, if data is available. We hypothesize that the potential for data storage savings will substantially increase with the size of the network data set. Ultimately, we believe that dark networks can be modeled using targeted social information sets without the added storage requirements of additional layers.
